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For the Sake of the Children 
A NEW APPROACH TO SECURING  
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIGHTS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 25, 2006, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
effectively ruled that any law denying homosexual couples 
marriage rights granted to heterosexual couples violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the New Jersey State Constitution.1 
The court left the legislature with the semantic task of naming 
such a legal contract either a “marriage” or a “civil union,”2 but 
made clear in a unanimous decision that “committed same-sex 
couples must be afforded on equal terms the same rights and 
benefits enjoyed by married opposite-sex couples.”3 Despite 
stopping short of mandating the title of “marriage” for 
homosexual unions,4 the court in Lewis v. Harris forever 
altered the landscape of the gay marriage debate by handing 
down the first ever unanimous decision for the plaintiff in a 
gay marriage case.5 While the court’s resounding unanimity 
  
 1 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006). 
 2 See Tina Kelly, For Gay Couples, Ruling Has a Cash Value, N.Y. TIMES, 
October 28, 2006, at B5 (“Gay couples’ rights are less in dispute than a word for 
them.”).  
 3 Lewis, 908 A.2d. at 221.  
 4 The New Jersey Legislature ultimately chose to implement civil unions, 
rather than gay marriage. The new law, effective February 19, 2007, states in part: 
The Legislature has chosen to establish civil unions by amending the current 
marriage statute to include same-sex couples. In doing so, the Legislature is 
continuing its longstanding history of insuring equality under the laws for all 
New Jersey citizens by providing same-sex couples with the same rights and 
benefits as heterosexual couples who choose to marry.  
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28(f) (2006).  
 5 All seven justices agreed as to the violation of Equal Protection rights. The 
three dissenting justices did not disagree with the majority as to such a violation, but 
instead would have gone further, holding that only a state sanctioned institution 
termed “marriage” would be sufficient to ensure the fundamental right to marry for 
homosexual couples. See Lewis, 908 A.2d at 224-31 (Poritz, J., concurring in the 
holding). Not even the Massachusetts court was as definitive, with only a plurality of 
that court holding that gay marriage was required under the Massachusetts 
Constitution. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  
696 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
 
was remarkable, perhaps the most fascinating aspect of the 
New Jersey decision was the dicta employed by the court in 
reaching its landmark decision. Like no other prior case, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court focused extensively on the burdens 
faced by the children of homosexual couples denied the right to 
marry, rather than restricting its analysis to an examination of 
the rights withheld from the couples themselves.6 
Just three months prior to the Lewis decision, on July 6, 
2006, the State of New York’s highest court decided a gay 
marriage case of its own and, like its neighbor New Jersey, 
spent a considerable amount of time probing the marital 
benefits conferred upon children by the institution of 
marriage.7 However, New York’s judges undertook this inquiry 
with an eye toward an entirely opposite result and held that 
“the Legislature could rationally decide that, for the welfare of 
children, it is more important to promote stability, and to avoid 
instability, in opposite-sex [rather] than in same-sex 
relationships.”8 Armed with this analysis, the court ruled that a 
law forbidding homosexuals to marry would not offend the 
Equal Protection Clause of the New York Constitution when 
held up against a rational review standard.9  
The significance of these two cases, this Note will 
contend, does not lie in their contrasting results, but in their 
similar focus—the effects of marriage upon any child 
potentially living with homosexual parents. While the legal 
debate over gay marriage has been raging for over ten years,10 
this Note will argue that only recently has the debate over gay 
marriage evolved into a balancing act that considers not only 
the rights of same-sex couples, but also the rights of these 
couples’ children. More significantly, this Note will advance the 
possibility that this repeated deference to marriage’s third 
party, the child, will open up a challenge to anti-gay marriage 
laws and constitutional amendments that has not previously 
  
 6 See, e.g., Lewis, 908 A.2d at 217 (“[U]nder our current laws, committed 
same-sex couples and their children, are not afforded the benefits and protections 
available to similar heterosexual households.” (emphasis added)).  
 7 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).  
 8 Id. at 7. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (deciding the first significant gay marriage case 
in U.S. history over fourteen years ago).  
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been considered: an Equal Protection challenge based on a 
child’s right to presumed legitimacy at birth.11  
Part II of this Note will review the history of the gay 
marriage debate in the courts, from its Hawaiian beginnings in 
1993 up to the New Jersey court’s decision in 2006. Special 
attention will be paid to the evolution of judicial concerns with 
child rearing and the effect of marriage on children. Part III 
will briefly survey the history of Equal Protection 
jurisprudence related to distinctions drawn on the basis of 
illegitimacy. The benefits of presumed legitimacy granted to 
children born into wedlock will also be examined. Part IV will 
then argue that a child born into a household with same-sex, 
unwed parents could contend that laws barring her parents 
from marrying are an affront to her Equal Protection rights. 
New York will be used as a convenient model for this 
examination due to its recent decision upholding an 
interpretation of the marriage code as precluding homosexual 
marriage. By narrowly focusing on a single state and its laws, 
the potential of such a claim by a child may be accurately 
assessed. Finally, Part V of this Note will survey the current 
landscape of gay marriage nationwide (considering the relevant 
legislation and constitutional amendments) to argue that the 
New York model proposed in Part IV might be used as a 
nationwide attack on gay marriage bans—an attack no longer 
waged by the couples, but by their children. 
II. THE GAY MARRIAGE DEBATE—FOURTEEN YEARS  
AND COUNTING 
Over the years, the judicial focus in gay marriage cases 
has slowly begun to turn away from notions of individual 
liberty and toward the collective concerns of the family unit.12 
  
 11 Presumably, a child of gay parents could base an Equal Protection claim on 
any of the benefits afforded to children through the marital status of their parents. The 
New Jersey court noted, for example, that a child of a non-biological same-sex parent 
could not receive survivor benefits under the Worker’s Compensation Act if their 
parent was killed at work. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 218. However, this Note will pay special 
attention to the benefit of presumed legitimacy because the Supreme Court of the 
United States has expressly stated that Equal Protection claims based on legitimacy 
distinctions should be afforded intermediate review. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 
461 (1988).  
 12 Compare Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67 (holding that “marriage is a basic civil 
right”), with Lewis, 908 A.2d at 216 (“[New Jersey’s Domestic Partnership Act] does not 
provide to committed same-sex couples the family law protections available to married 
couples. The Act provides no comparable presumption of dual parentage to the non-
biological parent of a child born to a domestic partner.”).  
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This section tracks that progression to show the ever-
increasing role children have in the gay marriage conversation.  
A.  The Early Murmurs—Hawaii (1993), Alaska (1998),  
and Vermont (1999) 
In May of 1993, the first truly significant legal battle 
over gay marriage13 was decided by the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin.14 The plaintiffs, a collection of 
homosexual couples, filed suit alleging that the Director of the 
Department of Health unfairly denied their applications for 
marriage licenses based on the Department’s stance that the 
gendered nouns used in the marriage and consanguinity 
statutes of Hawaii proscribed such a license issuance.15 The 
plaintiffs alleged that this application of the marriage law 
violated their rights to privacy as well as the equal protection 
and due process clauses of the Hawaii Constitution.16 The court 
gave little credence to the right to privacy and Due Process 
claims brought by the plaintiffs based on a finding that the 
right to gay marriage was not a fundamental right warranting 
protection.17 Importantly, however, the court ruled that the 
denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the 
equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution because the 
practice of denying same-sex couples marriage licenses drew 
distinctions based on gender.18 
This ruling of the Supreme Court of Hawaii marked the 
first significant judicial challenge to the traditional 
interpretation of marriage law in the United States.19 When 
  
 13 In January of 1993, Dean v. District of Columbia, Civil Act No. 90-13892, 
1992 WL 685364, at *1 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), aff’d 653 A.2d 307 (1995), was 
decided, holding that any claims to gay marriage rights were not protected under the 
Federal Constitution. While this is significant, the Hawaii decision showed that a state 
constitutional challenge could prove successful. As such the bulk of cases dealing with 
gay marriage has been, and continues to be, fought in the state courts.  
 14 852 P.2d 44. 
 15 Id. at 48-49. 
 16 Id. at 50. 
 17 Id. at 57. 
 18 Id. at 67. The court also held that the sex based classifications would be 
held to a strict scrutiny standard in the state of Hawaii, meaning that the marriage 
law in question necessitated a compelling state interest and a narrow tailoring of the 
law to meet that interest. Id.  
 19 LOWELL TONG, Comparing Mixed-Race and Same-Sex Marriage, in ON THE 
ROAD TO SAME SEX MARRIAGE 109, 119 (Robert P. Cabaj & David W. Purcell eds., 1998) 
(“Although there were previous attempts to recognize same-sex unions legally, a case 
heard by the Hawaii State Supreme Court, Baehr v. Lewin in 1993, is considered to be 
a landmark case.”).  
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assessing the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the Hawaii 
court noted the various disadvantages facing homosexual 
couples who are denied marriage rights granted to married 
heterosexual couples: tax advantages, public assistance from 
the Department of Human Services, control of community 
property, inheritance rights, the right to spousal support, the 
right to name change, post-divorce rights, the spousal privilege 
granted pursuant to the Rule of Evidence, and the right to 
bring a wrongful death action.20 While this list was presumably 
not meant to be exhaustive, it curiously makes mention of only 
one right related to child rearing, the right to an “award of 
child custody and support payments in divorce proceedings.”21 
In fact, the only other mentions of children in the court’s 
opinion were made when the court discussed case law 
regarding the right to privacy22 (not the claim upon which the 
court rested its opinion) and when the court restated the 
Department of Health’s opinion that the denial of gay marriage 
rights protects the type of family unit that provides “a 
nurturing environment to children born to married persons,” a 
claim to which the court did not respond.23 Based on this paltry 
reference to the role of children in the same-sex marriage 
equation, it is fair to say that in May of 1993, this court’s 
attention was not keenly focused on the rights of children 
reared by homosexual parents.24 
In 1998, Alaska became the second state to tackle the 
issue of gay marriage in the courts.25 In Brause v. Bureau of 
Vital Statistics, the Superior Court of Alaska faced an even 
stronger challenge than the Supreme Court of Hawaii.26 Where 
the Hawaii court in Baehr ruled on a statute that implicitly 
forbade gay marriage by use of gender specific terms, the 
  
 20 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 56. 
 23 Id. at 52. 
 24 Of course, the reason may be that gay parents were either marginally 
existent or existed outside of the public consciousness. However, the reason for this 
omission is insignificant; the fact remains that in the earliest case in the gay marriage 
debate, the children affected stood by in the shadows.  
 25 See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 
88743, at *1 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25. 
 26 Compare Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67 (“[W]e have not held . . . the appellants 
have a civil right to a same sex marriage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with 
Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (“The court finds that marriage, i.e., the recognition of 
one’s choice of a life partner, is a fundamental right.”).  
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Brause court was faced with a statute that expressly forbade 
gay marriage.27 The plaintiffs in Brause contested an Alaskan 
law that defined marriage as between a man and a woman.28 
With the stronger prohibition came a stronger ruling from the 
court, and the Alaska judiciary struck down the Marriage Code 
at issue when it held that “marriage, i.e., the recognition of 
one’s choice of a life partner, is a fundamental right.”29 The 
Brause court saw the gay marriage issue primarily as an issue 
of personal liberty;30 as such, the court never considered the 
benefits that a recognized marriage affords to any of the 
affected parties—partners and children alike.31  
Finally, in 1999, the first gay marriage case to ever 
significantly deal with the rights and securities granted to 
children through marriage was decided in Vermont.32 In Baker 
v. Vermont, three homosexual couples brought suit against the 
state after each couple had been denied a marriage license from 
their town clerk.33 The State contended that “the Legislature 
[was] justified . . . ‘in using the marriage statutes to send a 
public message that procreation and child rearing are 
intertwined.’”34 Plaintiffs offered numerous theories of recovery, 
including an assertion that the plain language of the Vermont 
marriage statute allowed for gay marriage.35 However, the 
holding, which ultimately granted marriage rights, was not 
grounded in the right to privacy, the Federal Equal Protection 
Clause or the due process clause of the Vermont Constitution, 
but rather in the novel common benefits clause36 that is unique 
  
 27 Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1 (citing ALASKA MARRIAGE CODE 
§ 25.05.011(a)). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at *3. In fact, the precedent upon which the Brause court premised its 
decision was a ruling 30 years prior, holding it unconstitutional for public schools to set 
hair length limitations on its students. See Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 175 (Alaska 
1972).  
 31 The Brause decision is decidedly the shortest gay marriage decision in 
American jurisprudence. The court quickly held that marriage is a fundamental right 
and therefore did not address any of the other arguments that are hallmarks of other 
major gay marriage cases. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4.  
 32 See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 884-85 (Vt. 1999).  
 33 Id. at 867. 
 34 Id. at 881. 
 35 Id. at 868-70. 
 36 The common benefits clause reads: 
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the 
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of 
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to the State of Vermont.37 Regardless of this anomalous 
posturing, it is nonetheless significant that Vermont became 
the first state to recognize that the concerns expressed by 
homosexual couples included protection of their children’s 
rights:  
They [plaintiff-couples] argue that the large number of married 
couples without children, and the increasing incidence of same-sex 
couples with children, undermines the State’s rationale [for denying 
gay marriage]. They note that Vermont law affirmatively guarantees 
the right to adopt and raise children regardless of the sex of the 
parents, see 15A V.S.A. § 1-102, and challenge the logic of a 
legislative scheme that recognizes the rights of same-sex partners as 
parents, yet denies them—and their children—the same security as 
spouses.38 
The court adopted the plaintiffs’ argument regarding the rights 
of children in making its ruling and noted that “the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from the legal protections incident to 
marriage exposes their children to the precise risks that the 
State argues the marriage laws are designed to secure 
against.”39 
Ultimately, the court held that same-sex couples were 
entitled to “the same benefits and protections afforded by 
Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples,”40 but reserved to 
the legislature the right to craft laws facilitating this mandate. 
However, the true seismic shift in this case was the court’s 
willingness to turn the State’s interest in protecting children 
into an argument favoring same-sex marriage.41 The court 
  
persons, who are a part only of that community; and that the community 
hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform or alter 
government, in such manner as shall be, by that community, judged most 
conducive to the public weal. 
VT. CONST. art. 7.  
 37 Baker, 744 A.2d at 870, 880-86 (“[I]t is the Common Benefits Clause of the 
Vermont Constitution we are construing, rather than its counterpart, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. . . . 
[T]he Common Benefits Clause . . . differs markedly from the federal Equal Protection 
Clause in its language, historical origins, purpose, and development.”). 
 38 Id. at 870 (emphasis added).  
 39 Id. at 882 (emphasis omitted). 
 40 Id. at 886. Ultimately, the Vermont Legislature rejected gay marriage in 
favor of civil unions. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2002). 
 41 The court stated: 
The legal benefits and protections flowing from a marriage license are of such 
significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on 
public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of 
the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned. Considered in light of the 
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recognized that “a significant number of children today are 
actually being raised by same-sex parents, and that increasing 
numbers of children are being conceived by such parents” and 
refused to accept the State’s argument that its interest in 
promoting procreation was a compelling justification for 
denying same-sex marriage rights.42 Instead, the court clearly 
drew the opposite conclusion and stated that “to the extent that 
the state’s purpose in licensing civil marriage was, and is, to 
legitimize children and provide for their security, the statutes 
plainly exclude many same-sex couples who are no different 
from opposite-sex couples with respect to these objectives.”43 It 
was this logic, adopted by the Baker court on December 20, 
1999, that truly gave force to the gay marriage debate.44 
B.  The Exclamation—The Massachusetts Supreme  
Judicial Court (2003) 
With Vermont’s historic adoption of civil unions, the 
momentum seemed to be building toward a possible recognition 
of full same-sex marriage rights within the United States. And 
then, in 2003, along came Massachusetts.45 The Massachusetts 
  
extreme logical disjunction between the classification and the stated purposes 
of the law—protecting children and ‘furthering the link between procreation 
and child rearing’—the exclusion falls substantially short of this standard. 
The laudable governmental goal of promoting a commitment between 
married couples to promote the security of their children and the community 
as a whole provides no reasonable basis for denying the legal benefits and 
protections of marriage to same-sex couples, who are no differently situated 
with respect to this goal than their opposite-sex counterparts. 
Baker, 744 A.2d at 884 (emphasis omitted).  
 42 Id. at 881, 884.  
 43 Id. at 882 (emphasis added).  
 44 In 1998, both Alaska and Hawaii passed constitutional amendments, 
essentially erasing each state’s holdings with regard to gay marriage. See ALASKA 
CONST. art. 1, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only 
between one man and one woman.”); HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (“The legislature shall 
have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).  
  It is interesting to note that it was in Vermont, with the judiciary’s unique 
recognition of gay couples as parents in Baker, that gay marriage rights, in the form of 
civil unions, first gained real traction. 
 45 From a historical perspective, it is not surprising that Massachusetts was 
the first state to allow gay marriage as the state’s marriage law was always premised 
on marriage being a secular institution:  
It was clear to Plymouth . . . that the best way to avoid interference from the 
High Church party that controlled early seventeenth century England was to 
keep as free as possible from political and religious affiliation with England’s 
government. Ministers of the established church were at that time the only 
authorized celebrants of marriage in England; in Plymouth, following the 
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court’s decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 
remains the only case in the United States to have granted full 
marriage rights to homosexual couples.46 The ruling came on 
the heels of the major Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas.47 However, as will be seen, the Goodridge court was less 
concerned with the notions of personal choice that underpinned 
the Lawrence decision and more influenced by the Baker court’s 
perception of marriage as an institution for child rearing.48  
In June of 2003, the United States Supreme Court ruled 
in Lawrence that the right to privacy, rooted in the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution, precludes the government of any 
state from interfering in the private sexual choices made by 
consenting individuals.49 Specifically, the Court overturned 
anti-sodomy laws in Texas that were primarily directed toward 
homosexual conduct.50 Some scholars immediately read the 
  
custom with which the colonists had become familiar in Holland, civil 
ceremonies only were countenanced. 
FRED S. HALL & MARY E. RICHMOND, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE 22-23 (1929). The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge echoed such a historical 
understanding of the marriage code: “In Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since 
pre-Colonial days has been, precisely what its name implies: a wholly secular 
institution.” Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003). 
  Furthermore, some analysts saw the struggle for gay marriage in 
Massachusetts as having “roots that go back at least to 1989, when the Commonwealth 
became the second state in the nation (after Wisconsin in 1982) to include sexual 
orientation in statewide laws banning discrimination in employment and public 
accommodations.” DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
34 (2006). 
 46 See, e.g., Cece Cox, To Have and To Hold—Or Not: The Influence of the 
Christian Right on Gay Marriage Laws in the Netherlands, Canada, and the United 
States, 14 LAW & SEXUALITY REV. LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL 
ISSUES 1, 6 (2005) (“Currently, only one of the fifty states, Massachusetts, has 
recognized gay marriage.”). See generally Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 47 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding unconstitutional Texas laws prohibiting 
sodomy).  
 48 Compare Baker, 744 A.2d at 882 (“[T]he exclusion of same-sex couples from 
the legal protections incident to marriage exposes their children to the precise risks 
that the State argues the marriage laws are designed to secure against.” (emphasis 
omitted)), with Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964 (“Excluding same-sex couples from civil 
marriage . . . does prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the 
immeasurable advantages that flow [through marriage].”). 
  That Massachusetts would confront marriage law from a similar viewpoint 
as one of its New England neighbors is consistent with the history of the region. See 
Hall, supra note 45, at 22 (“Beginning with Massachusetts, we find that it shares with 
the entire New England group of states a development different from that of all other 
sections of the country.”). 
 49 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“[I]ndividual decisions . . . concerning the 
intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a 
form of ‘liberty’ protected by [the Due Process Clause]” (quoting Bowers v Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 50 Justice Kennedy wrote: 
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ruling to suggest that “[i]f a state singles out gays for 
unprecedentedly harsh treatment, the Court will presume 
what is going on is a bare desire to harm, rather than moral 
disapproval . . . plac[ing] all antigay laws under suspicion.”51 
This perception, coupled with the timing of the Massachusetts 
ruling in Goodridge52 only five months later, made it easy to 
assume there was a causal connection between the two 
rulings.53 Indeed, the Massachusetts court immediately 
referenced the Lawrence decision in the second paragraph of its 
ruling in Goodridge.54 However, the substance of the 
Massachusetts ruling owes less of a debt to the Supreme Court 
than it does to the Baker decision from Vermont.55  
In Goodridge, seven couples challenged the Department 
of Health’s decision to refuse to issue marriage licenses to the 
same-sex couples.56 The same-sex partners had met all the 
express requirements of the marriage code necessary to obtain 
a license; however, the Department of Health rejected their 
applications based on the Department’s understanding that 
Massachusetts did not recognize same-sex marriage.57 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that the ordinary 
  
The [anti-sodomy] statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, 
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty 
of persons to choose without being punished as criminals . . . . When sexuality 
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct 
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty 
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make 
this choice. 
Id. at 567.  
 51 Symposium, Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 
1019 (2004). 
 52 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941. Goodridge was decided in November of 
2003; the Lawrence Court made its ruling the preceding June. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
558.  
 53 In fact, this seems to be a popular common perception. See David Moats, 
CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE 265 (2004) (“The court’s reasoning in the 
Lawrence case paralleled the reasoning of the plaintiffs in the Goodridge case, 
particularly in its emphasis on the right to privacy in decisions about intimate 
conduct.”); see also Same-Sex Marriage Status in the United States by Statute, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_state_laws_on_same-sex_unions (“In 2003, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas paved the way for same-sex marriage to 
emerge as a hot-button political issue. Since Massachusetts became the first state to 
legalize same-sex marriage in 2004, other states have rushed to either restrict or 
liberalize their own marriage laws.”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2007).  
 54 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (“Our obligation is to define liberty of all, not 
to mandate our own moral code.” (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571)). 
 55 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  
 56 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 949.  
 57 Id. at 950. 
2008] SECURING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIGHTS 705 
 
usage of the term “marriage,” when used by the legislature in 
the marriage code, did preclude homosexual marriage.58 
However, the court went on to say that because the state had 
no rational basis for denying same-sex couples the right to 
marry, the practice of denying marriage licenses to homosexual 
partners was a violation of equal protection under the 
Massachusetts Constitution.59 In the course of this 
determination, the court’s repeated references to the children 
of homosexual partners were truly fascinating.  
Reasoning related to the equal protection of children 
raised by gay parents, unseen before Vermont’s decision in 
Baker,60 permeates the Goodridge decision.61 The Vermont court 
held that the impositions placed upon the children of gay 
parents undermined the state’s purported interest in 
differentiating between straight and gay couples’ marriage 
rights.62 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took this 
concept further and found that such a detriment to these 
children was an affirmative reason to view gay marriage as a 
civil right.63 When making its determination the court 
recognized: 
[M]arital children reap a measure of family stability and economic 
security based on their parents’ legally privileged status that is 
largely inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to nonmarital 
children. Some of these benefits are social, such as the enhanced 
approval that still attends the status of being a marital child. Others 
are material, such as the greater ease of access to family-based State 
and Federal benefits that attend the presumptions of one’s 
parentage.64 
Viewing the issue through this child-centered lens, the court 
concluded, “It is undoubtedly for these concrete reasons . . . 
that civil marriage has long been termed a ‘civil right.’”65 
  
 58 Id. at 953.  
 59 Id. at 961. 
 60 See supra Part II.A.  
 61 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964 (“Excluding same-sex couples from civil 
marriage will not make children of opposite-sex marriages more secure, but it does 
prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages that 
flow from the assurance of ‘a stable family structure in which children will be reared, 
educated, and socialized.’” (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995 (Cordy, J., 
dissenting))); id. at 963 (“[T]he task of child rearing for same-sex couples is made 
infinitely harder by their status as outliers to the marriage laws.”).  
 62 See supra Part II.A.  
 63 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956-57.  
 64 Id. 
 65 Id.  
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Furthermore, the Goodridge court took the 
unprecedented step of enumerating certain parental rights as 
“benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license.”66 
Specifically, the court explicitly recognized that “[e]xclusive 
marital benefits that are not directly tied to property rights 
include the presumptions of legitimacy and parentage of 
children born to a married couple.”67 It is largely due to this 
type of consideration—a broad view of marriage as a parental 
construct—that enabled the Goodridge court to find that no 
legislative rationale for anti-gay marriage laws could survive 
even a rational basis examination.68 The court therefore found 
it unnecessary to consider the plaintiff-couple’s argument that 
their case merited a stricter standard of review.69 
Ultimately, the Massachusetts court summarily rejected 
the Department of Health’s proposed legislative rationales.70 
The court concluded that “[e]xcluding same-sex couples from 
civil marriage will not make children of opposite-sex couples 
marriages more secure, but it does prevent children of same-
sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages that 
flow from the assurance of ‘a stable family structure in which 
children will be reared, educated, and socialized.’”71 The 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, without ever 
expressly citing the case, built on the dicta in Baker v. Vermont 
to reach its finding that “barring an individual from the 
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely 
because that person would marry a person of the same sex 
violates” equal protection.72 While the press and the public were 
acutely aware of the benefits that homosexual couples had 
gained after Goodridge, most everyone neglected, and 
  
 66 Id. at 955. 
 67 Id. at 956 (emphasis added).  
 68 “Because the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not 
consider the plaintiffs’ arguments that this case merits strict judicial scrutiny.” Id. at 
961. 
 69 Id.  
 70 The Court wrote: 
The department posits three legislative rationales for prohibiting same-sex 
couples from marrying: (1) providing a “favorable setting for procreation”;  
(2) ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department 
defines as “a two-parent family with one parent of each sex”; and (3) 
preserving scarce State and private financial resources. 
Id. 
 71 Id. at 964.  
 72 Id. at 969. 
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continues to neglect, the consideration of children’s rights that 
swayed the plurality.73 As Goodridge remains the only case in 
the United States to grant full marriage rights to homosexuals, 
its reasoning is a touchtone for the gay marriage debate that 
seemingly must be either expounded upon or discredited. 
Therefore, Goodridge’s treatment of marriage’s effects on the 
children of gay parents will be central to any challenges 
brought by opponents of gay marriage prohibitions.  
C.  The Aftermath—Arizona, Indiana, New York, and  
New Jersey (2004-2006) 
The backlash against the Goodridge decision was 
immediate and fierce,74 and perhaps inevitable.75 Prior to the 
ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court in late 2006, courts 
across the country that were faced with the gay marriage 
question seemed to be riding the political pendulum’s swing 
away from the Vermont and Massachusetts trend. Courts in 
Arizona,76 Indiana,77 and New York78 all upheld statutory 
schemes barring gay marriage. Even the appellate court in 
New Jersey upheld a statutory interpretation of the marriage 
code as prohibiting gay marriage,79 although the New Jersey 
State Supreme Court ultimately overturned its ruling in Lewis 
v. Harris.80 However, as the momentum of the debate shifted 
  
 73 See, e.g., Jason McLure, Tears of Joy, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 2003.  
 74 One year after Goodridge, in the November election, thirteen states 
approved constitutional amendments banning gay marriage, nullifying the prospect of 
judicial interference. See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An 
Interpretive Framework for Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 
REGENT U. L. REV. 221, 221 (2005). In total today, “more than 35 states have 
introduced legislation aimed at preserving the traditional definition of marriage as a 
union between a man and a woman.” Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay 
Marriage Laws (updated Nov. 3, 2004), Stateline.org, http://www.stateline.org/live/ 
ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=15576.    
 75 See Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Learning 
from Brown v. Board of Education and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1493 
(2006) (comparing the legal and social backlash against desegregation in light of Brown 
v. Board of Education with the recent backlash following Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (And Goodridge), 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 431 (2005) (same).  
 76 Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 463 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).  
 77 Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. App. 2005).  
 78 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 22 (N.Y. 2006); see discussion supra 
Part I.  
 79 Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 271, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), 
modified, 908 A.2d 196 (2006).  
 80 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006); see discussion supra Part I.  
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toward a rejection of gay marriage rights (as evidenced by 
victories in courts across the country), the judicial focus in 
these cases appeared to remain the same; the central question 
continued, and continues, to be “what is best for the children?”  
For example, in Standhardt v. Superior Court, the 
Arizona Court of Appeals took a particularly questionable 
bright-line approach in this regard, upholding the prohibition 
of gay marriage, while nonetheless admitting to the inequities 
visited upon the children of gay parents caused by the 
decision.81 The case revolved around a familiar tale: a 
homosexual couple applied for a marriage license and their 
application was denied.82 The couple appealed directly to the 
Arizona Court of Appeals and the court chose to exercise 
jurisdiction.83 As in Goodridge and Baker, the case primarily 
hinged upon whether the Legislature of the state could show a 
rational basis for a state law barring gay marriage.84 As seen 
before, the state premised its rationale for barring gay 
marriage on “encouraging procreation and child-rearing within 
the stable environment traditionally associated with marriage” 
and contended that “limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples 
is rationally related to that interest.”85 The plaintiffs, as 
expected, argued that the law was both over- and under-
inclusive because not all heterosexual couples have children, 
while numerous gay couples do raise children.86 The court 
conceded that the plaintiffs’ position was persuasive.87 
However, despite the concession, the court stated, “A perfect fit 
is not required under the rational basis test, and [the court] 
will not overturn a statute merely because it is not made with 
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some 
inequality.”88  
The Arizona court brazenly admitted that deference to 
the state’s purported legislative intent would result in “some 
inequality.”89 What is vastly more striking, however, is that the 
  
 81 Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82 Id. at 454.  
 83 “We accept jurisdiction over this special action because there is no equally 
plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal.” Id.  
 84 The court held that because the right to same-sex marriage was not a 
fundamental right, the standard of review should be the minimal test. Id. at 460-61. 
 85 Id. at 461.  
 86 Id. at 462.  
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id.  
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court went on to specify exactly what demographic would suffer 
at the hands of this inequality: children, the very group the 
state claimed it was trying to protect.90 The court stated:  
Children raised in families headed by a same-sex couple deserve and 
benefit from bilateral parenting within long-term, committed 
relationships just as much as children with married parents. Thus, 
children in same-sex families could benefit from the stability offered 
by same-sex marriage, particularly if such children do not have ties 
with both biological parents. But although the line drawn between 
couples who may marry (opposite-sex) and those who may not (same-
sex) may result in some inequity for children raised by same-sex 
couples, such inequity is insufficient to negate the State’s link 
between opposite-sex marriage, procreation, and child-rearing.91 
The Arizona Court of Appeals may be right in its final 
analysis.92 However, this admitted inequality raises a unique 
question. Specifically, if the marriage laws of a state do in fact 
treat children differently based on the nature of their family 
unit, might such disadvantaged children have a cause of action 
in opposition to anti-gay marriage legislation?93 
III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION 
BASED ON ILLEGITIMACY 
As suggested, it is conceivable that a child of gay 
parents may attempt an equal protection attack on anti-gay 
  
 90 Id. at 463. 
 91 Id. (emphasis added). 
 92 While it is not addressed directly, the court appears to be correct that 
unequal treatment of a group that is not a party to the action cannot save the plaintiff’s 
claim if the court does indeed believe that promoting heterosexual unions is a 
legitimate government purpose. The children simply have no standing to seek redress 
for the admitted harm. Therefore, if the children are not a party to the action, the fact 
that they suffer unequal treatment under the law does little to bolster the plaintiff-
couple’s claim of disparate treatment. 
 93 The Court of Appeals in Indiana offered a novel explanation for its own 
adoption of this inequitable scheme in Morrison v. Sadler. 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2005). There, the court reasoned that because same-sex couples must become 
parents by virtue of costly adoptions or artificial reproductive means, the children of 
such gay parents are, by necessity, being brought into families with a monetary and 
emotional commitment to having a child, ensuring some measure of stability. On the 
other hand, because opposite-sex couples may inadvertently become pregnant, the 
Legislature has an interest in inducing such accidental parents into a marriage 
relationship that will provide greater security for the child. See id.  
  While this argument is admittedly clever, it does not deny the unequal 
protection under the law faced by the children of gay parents, discussed infra Parts III-
IV. Rather, the Indiana court has merely provided a fascinating justification for the 
inequality.  
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marriage laws.94 This section will explore one possible avenue 
for bringing such a claim: inequitable treatment based on 
illegitimacy. If such an attack were mounted, it would be 
desirable to argue that anti-gay marriage laws discriminate 
against the children of gay parents on the basis of illegitimacy 
because such claims carry an established heightened standard 
of review, namely, intermediate review.95  
The Supreme Court “consistently has invalidated laws 
that deny a benefit to all nonmarital children that is accorded 
to all marital children.”96 It has also been noted that, as the 
Court in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. stated, “[N]o 
child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate 
child is an ineffectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring 
the parent.”97 It is therefore clear that federal jurisprudence 
frowns upon laws that draw distinctions between legitimate 
and illegitimate children.98 But what about a law, like the 
traditional marriage code, that provides unequal access to the 
right to be considered “legitimate” at birth? Whether the 
traditional man-woman marriage code violates equal protection 
by denying the children of same-sex couples the opportunity to 
be considered the legitimate child of both same-sex parents at 
birth is a difficult question. A look at the traditional 
application of the intermediate standard of review in 
illegitimacy cases provides some insight.  
In 1988, the Supreme Court heard the case of Clark v. 
Jeter, a case that concerned a Pennsylvania statute that 
required paternity suits to be brought within six years of the 
birth of an illegitimate child.99 In holding that the statute 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal 
Constitution, the Court explicitly applied the intermediate 
  
 94 It is likely that any such suit would be brought on behalf of the child by the 
parent. A general Equal Protection claim could be brought by the unmarried parents at 
any time; however, arguing unequal application of presumed legitimacy would be 
notably difficult, as the child would not be able to bring suit until after birth, at which 
point the presumption of legitimacy from birth will have become moot. However, this 
situation is similar to other cases in that it involves a claim that it is capable of 
repetition, but evading review. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); S. Pac. 
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1919). For the purpose of conjecturing about 
the possibility of such a claim, this Note will simply presume that standing to bring the 
lawsuit may be established under this standard.  
 95 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).  
 96 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§ 9.6, at 749 (2d ed. 2002); see, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).  
 97 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).  
 98 See, e.g., Clark, 486 U.S. 456. 
 99 Id.  
2008] SECURING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RIGHTS 711 
 
standard of review, which requires a substantial relation 
between the challenged legislation and an important 
government objective in order to withstand scrutiny.100 The 
Court’s consideration of that link notably contemplated the 
financial concerns related to child rearing. The Court wrote:  
[I]t is questionable whether Pennsylvania’s 6-year period is 
reasonable . . . since such a mother [with an illegitimate child] might 
realize only belatedly a loss of income attributable to the need to 
care for the child; and since financial difficulties are likely to 
increase as the child matures and incurs additional expenses.101  
Evidently, optimizing the financial security of children is one 
consideration to be made when applying intermediate scrutiny 
in the illegitimacy context. This concern surely applies to a 
child of same-sex parents who, in the absence of legitimization 
under the marriage laws of the state, has only one parent 
legally obligated to support her in the event her same-sex 
parents should separate.102  
Furthermore, the Court has given illegitimacy a 
heightened standard of review because children born 
illegitimately cannot change their status after birth.103 So what 
of children born to gay or lesbian parents who desire to be 
married but are prevented by law? The children born into these 
relationships are essentially conferred the status of 
“illegitimate” as a function of law.104 To be sure, an argument 
could be made that because jurisprudence condemns 
differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate children, 
there is little worry that children forced into an illegitimate 
birth by anti-gay marriage laws will suffer ill effects. However, 
it is equally plausible that the courts, relying on case law 
forbidding unfair disadvantages for illegitimate children,105 
would look with similar disfavor upon laws that create, by 
  
 100 Id. at 461.  
 101 Id. at 456-57. 
 102 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 (Mass. 2004); see 
also Margaret S. Osborne, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage for 
Lesbian Co-Partners, 49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 366 (2004) (discussing the problems of 
custody and visitation of children when a same-sex partnership dissolves). 
 103 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96, at 748.  
 104 It is not entirely clear whether children born to married lesbians would be 
considered “legitimate” by definition, but it is clear that such children have no chance 
to be legitimized if the parents are barred from marrying. See infra Part IV for further 
discussion of whether a child born to gay parents could ever be considered “legitimate.” 
 105 See generally Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); N.J. Welfare Rights 
Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1972).  
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virtue of exclusion, this very distinction between similarly 
situated children.106 For example, when a man and woman are 
married and the woman conceives via artificial insemination 
from a sperm donor, although the child will not be the 
biological child of the husband, there will still be a presumption 
of legitimacy that flows through the marriage to that child.107 
However, for a lesbian couple, if one of the partners is 
artificially inseminated by a donor, there will be no 
presumption that the non-birth-giving woman is the legitimate 
parent of the child.108  
The idea of two women sharing the status of legitimate 
parent is not entirely foreign to the law. A California case, 
Johnson v. Calvert,109 opened the door to such a legal 
possibility. In Johnson, the court found two women to be the 
legal mothers of the same child, without the requirement of 
adoption proceedings.110 A woman provided her egg to be 
implanted in a surrogate.111 After relations between the 
biological mother and the surrogate deteriorated, litigation was 
initiated to determine who had a legal right to the child.112 The 
court determined that California law allowed for motherhood to 
be established either by a showing of genetic relationship or 
through proof of actual childbirth.113 Ultimately, the court 
determined that the woman who had donated her egg was the 
mother entitled to the child, based primarily on the weight of 
the parties’ intent.114  
  
 106 For an overall examination of legitimacy as it pertains to gay marriage, see 
generally Benjamin G. Ledsham, Note, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage 
Through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373 
(2007). 
 107 See, e.g., 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Domestic Relations § 843 (“There is a 
presumption that a child born in wedlock, that is, while the mother was united to a 
husband in marriage, including a valid common-law marriage, is legitimate.”). 
 108 While it may seem controversial that two women can be the legitimate 
parents of the same child, such a statement would not contradict the plain meaning of 
the word. “Legitimate” is defined as “conceived or born of parents legally married” or 
more generally as “sanctioned by law or custom.” WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH 
CENTURY DICTIONARY 1035 (2d ed. 1983). In other words, legitimacy is that which the 
law makes legitimate. 
 109 851 P.2d 776 (1993). 
 110 Id. at 781. 
 111 Id. at 778. 
 112 Id.  
 113 Id. at 781. 
 114 Id. at 782; see also ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXTS, PROBLEMS 
1055 (4th ed. 2004).  
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The result in Johnson led two lesbian partners to test 
the limits of the ruling’s application.115 One of the female 
partners provided the egg, while the other carried and gave 
birth to the child; their legal intent was that both be considered 
the mothers of the child, and accordingly a California judge 
“issued a pre-birth decree recognizing both women as the 
child’s legal mothers.”116 While this conclusion is likely unique 
to the California jurisdiction, it does lend credence to the 
theory that two women, as partners, can legally be the 
legitimate parents of a single child.117 So how might a child of 
gay parents bring an action claiming that this denial of the 
presumption of legitimacy violates equal protection?  
IV. THE HYPOTHETICAL CHALLENGE 
Operating under these newly arrived at assumptions—
that two women can legally be the legitimate parents of a child 
at birth and that denying such a child this presumption of 
legitimacy may give rise to an intermediate standard of judicial 
review—this section will now consider the substance of an 
Equal Protection challenge brought on behalf a child.  
A.  Background 
As a foundational matter, it is important to recognize 
the realities of gay parenting in the United States today. 
According to a U.S. census report published in February of 
2003, approximately twenty-two percent of cohabitating male 
partners are raising a child under the age of eighteen, while 
  
 115 The lesbian couple in question was Linda McAllister and Leslee Subak. For 
further description of the couple, their son Max, and their case in general, see Osborne, 
supra note 102, at 371 n.57. As of late 2004, McAllister and Subak continued to live 
happily together, raising their son Max, who appears to live the normal life of a five-
year-old, despite having the distinction of being the first child with two mothers legally 
conferred the title of “mom” as a result of a pre-birth decree. See Tomas Van Houtryve, 
The Gayby Boomers, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 7, 2004, available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4159/is_20041107/ai_n12761783 (“Leslee 
and Linda tell me that the pre-school [Max] attend[s] has many other children from 
same-sex parents. The youngsters can relate to their playmates and fit in easily.”).  
 116 ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 114, at 1055 (citing Carol Ness, Lesbian Moms 
Gain Rights, S.F. EXAMINER, May 2, 1999, at A1).  
 117 Note that while much of the discussion that follows operates under the 
hypothetical of two lesbian women having a child who brings an Equal Protection suit, 
if gay marriage were extended to lesbian women as a result of such a suit, the 
government would be virtually required to grant homosexual marriage rights to men 
based on typical gender-based Equal Protection grounds completely apart from the 
considerations of children put forth herein. 
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approximately thirty-three percent of cohabitating female 
partners are raising a minor child.118 These percentages hold 
true regardless of the geographic region of the country.119 For 
example, “[t]he South had the highest percentage [of lesbian 
partners] with [their] own [child] under 18 years of age (34%), 
while the Northeast had the lowest (31%).”120 In fact, one 
commentator concluded the census data indicated same-sex 
couples were living in 96% of the counties in the United 
States.121 If one in four of those couples are raising children, as 
indicated by the census, it is reasonable to assume that 
virtually every county in the United States is home to one or 
more sets of homosexual parents.122  
Furthermore, despite the discontent of certain groups,123 
the vast majority of states allow children to be adopted by 
same-sex couples.124 Only one state, Florida, forbids gay parents 
from adopting,125 making it fair to say that standard practice 
around the country is to allow gay parents to raise children. 
Moreover, the right to procreate has long been established as a 
fundamental right that no governmental action is allowed to 
contravene.126 With these facts not in question, it is fair to draw 
three conclusions. First, because the right to procreate has 
been deemed a fundamental right, homosexual parents have an 
undisputed right to give birth via artificial insemination or 
otherwise.127 Second, homosexual parents cannot be denied 
adoption rights simply because of their sexual orientation.128 
  
 118 See TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O’CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
CENSR-5, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, 9 (2003).  
 119 Id. The census figures subdivide the country into four regions: Northeast, 
Midwest, South, and West. The figures for each of the four regions are within two 
percentage points of the national average. Id. 
 120 Id. at 10.  
 121 See Michael Wilke, Research Booms on Same-Sex Couples, THE GULLY, 
May 28, 2004, http://www.thegully.com/essays/gay_mundo2/wilke/040528_gay_US_ 
census.html (citing GARY GATES ET AL., THE GAY & LESBIAN ATLAS (2004)) (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2007). 
 122 Id.; see also SIMMONS & O’CONNELL, supra note 118, at 9. 
 123 See, e.g., Lucy Ward, Anger at “Cheap Gimmick” of Anti-Gay Adoption 
Card, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 16, 2002, available at http://society.guardian.co.uk/ 
adoption/story/0,,812594,00.html (describing novelty donor-style cards released by a 
Christian group which read, “In the event of my death I do not want my children to be 
adopted by homosexuals”).  
 124 The only state with an explicit ban on homosexual adoption is Florida. See 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (2003); see also Osbourne, supra note 102, at 368. 
 125 See supra note 124. 
 126 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 127 See id.  
 128 See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2) (2007).  
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And third, homosexual parents exist in considerable numbers 
and are raising children in the United States today.129  
B.  New York as a Model  
The laws and demographics of New York State fall 
completely in line with the foregoing principles. New York 
adoption regulations specifically state, “Applicants shall not be 
rejected solely on the basis of homosexuality.”130 The term 
“family” has even been defined by the New York court for the 
purpose of rent control statutes; the judiciary has stated “the 
term family . . . should not be rigidly restricted to those people 
who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for 
instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order.”131 Rather, 
the court held as a matter of policy that the law’s protection 
should focus on the “reality of family life.”132 The court used this 
definition to hold that a deceased man’s homosexual partner 
had the right to assert a familial relationship to the decedent 
for the purpose of avoiding eviction when his partner, the lease 
holder, had passed away.133 In light of this precedent, there can 
be little doubt that New York courts recognize, if not encourage 
(particularly in the state adoption laws), the existence of 
homosexual family units raising children.134 
However, the New York court, in Hernandez v. Robles, 
ruled that gay marriage may be barred by statute in part 
because “[t]he Legislature could rationally believe that it is 
better . . . for children to grow up with both a mother and a 
father.”135 But based on the adoption laws of the state, it does 
not appear that the legislature actually believes that opposite-
sex couples are necessarily better equipped to raise children.136 
Rather, what the law of New York clearly evinces is that the 
“best interests” of children should be protected.137  
  
 129 See SIMMONS & O’CONNELL, supra note 118, at 9. 
 130 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 421.16(h)(2) (2007).  
 131 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53 (N.Y.1989).  
 132 Id.  
 133 Id at 53-54.  
 134  See, e.g., In re Jacob, An Infant, 660 N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995) (holding 
that the purpose of the adoption law is to “encourag[e] the adoption of as many children 
as possible regardless of the sexual orientation or marital status of the individuals 
seeking to adopt them”); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 421.16(h)(2) 
(2007). 
 135 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).  
 136 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 421.16(h)(2) (2007). 
 137 Id. 
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In In re Adoption of Evan, for example, a woman’s 
lesbian partner was allowed to adopt her biological son because 
the court viewed the adoption as “in Evan’s best interest.”138 
Evan’s best interests were served in that case because allowing 
said lesbian partner to adopt 
would serve only to provide him with important legal rights which 
he does not presently possess. It would afford him additional 
economic security because [his mother’s partner] would become 
legally obligated to support him. He would also be entitled to inherit 
from [his mother’s partner] and her family under the law of intestate 
succession and be eligible for social security benefits in the event of 
her disability or death. Of immediate practical import, he would be 
able to participate in the medical and educational benefits provided 
by her employment, which are more generous than those possessed 
by [his biological mother].139 
The court found it clear that the financial and emotional 
benefits of a two-parent household were in the best interest of a 
child;140 what is not entirely clear is whether gay marriage 
would confer those benefits as of right, circumnavigating the 
need for costly adoptions.141 
1.  Determining the Standard  
Suppose that a child born to gay parents, seeking the 
full financial benefits of a two-parent household already 
recognized by the New York courts, challenges the law that 
barred her parents from marrying before her birth, thereby 
precluding her from the benefits of presumed legitimacy. As 
discussed, her best claim would be that the law unreasonably 
violated her equal protection rights by discriminating based on 
illegitimacy.142 Once the equal protection claim is brought, 
discrimination based on illegitimacy would need to be shown in 
order to establish the application of intermediate scrutiny 
attendant to illegitimacy claims.143 The need to avoid costly 
cross-adoption proceedings is a powerful argument showing the 
unequal application of the law. Currently, once a child is born 
  
 138 In re Adoption of a Child Whose First Name Is Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 
999 (1992).  
 139 Id. at 998-99 (citations omitted).  
 140 Id.  
 141 See Kelley, supra note 2, at B1 (questioning how the New Jersey court’s 
decision will affect one lesbian partner’s ability to adopt, without financial cost, a child 
being carried by the other partner). 
 142 See supra Part III.  
 143 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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to gay parents (particularly lesbian partners), the non-birth-
giving partner can legally adopt in order to provide the child 
with all the rights attendant to a natural parent.144 However, 
this process can be long and expensive and may create a 
deterrent or, in many cases, a complete financial barrier.145 The 
children of heterosexual couples face no such barriers to 
receiving the full financial support of their parents; the 
heterosexual couple need only marry before the birth of the 
child, and there is a legal presumption that the child is 
legitimate.146  
This disparate treatment of unborn children, based 
solely on their parents’ access to the benefits of the marriage 
law, is ripe to be contested on Equal Protection grounds. 
Section 24 of the New York Domestic Relations Law states very 
generally:  
A child heretofore or hereafter born of parents who prior or 
subsequent to the birth of such child shall have entered into a civil 
or religious marriage, or shall have consummated a common-law 
marriage where such marriage is recognized as valid, in the manner 
authorized by the law of the place where such marriage takes place, 
is the legitimate child of both natural parents notwithstanding that 
such marriage is void or voidable or has been or shall hereafter be 
annulled or judicially declared void.147 
There is no gender-specific language in the statute.148 By the 
plain language of the law, if gay marriage were legal in New 
York, and two women legally married, if one of the women gave 
birth to a child, the presumption of the law would be that both 
women were the natural, legitimate parents of the child.149 As 
the Lewis court in New Jersey suggested, this type of presumed 
legitimacy would provide a child of gay parents with a variety 
of rights (for example, survivor rights under Worker’s 
Compensation) that would flow not only through the birth-
  
 144 See, e.g., In Re Adoption of a Child Whose First Name Is Evan, 583 
N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (1992). 
 145 See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 102, at 372 n.59 (“A second-parent adoption 
can cost from $2,500 to $3,000.”).  
 146 N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 24(1) (McKinney 1999). 
 147 Id.  
 148 The gender-specific noun terms employed in marriage codes (i.e., 
consanguity provisions) are often crippling to gay couples claims of a right to marry. 
E.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006). Even Massachusetts denied 
relief under the plain language of the marriage laws. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Mental 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 953 (Mass. 2003).  
 149 See discussion of Johnson v. Calvert, supra Part III; see also comments 
regarding the definition of “legitimate” supra note 108.  
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giving parent, but through both parents had they been legally 
married.150  
With the discriminatory access to presumed legitimacy 
made clear and the potential remedy established (that is, gay 
marriage), the final hurdle to proving an equal protection 
violation would be the language of the state constitution. The 
New York Constitution’s equal protection clause is simple and 
concise in its wording: “No person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision 
thereof.”151 The New York court held in Hernandez that gay 
marriage could be outlawed because restricting which couples 
could marry aided policies born out of “the undisputed 
assumption that marriage is important to the welfare of 
children.”152 The inference to be drawn is that the marriage 
code is primarily meant to protect children. However, if the law 
is designed to protect children, it must do so equally under 
New York’s equal protection clause.153 Therefore, a child (or the 
parents on that child’s behalf) could presumably challenge the 
unequal application of the marriage laws, claiming the law 
creates inequitable distinctions based on legitimacy. This 
argument, if successful, would warrant review of the marriage 
law under intermediate scrutiny,154 circumnavigating the 
Hernandez court’s reluctance to apply intermediate scrutiny 
based on gender inequality.155 
The central question before the court in such a 
challenge would be whether the marriage law discriminates on 
the basis of legitimacy. A differentiation is made between 
children born into wedlock and those born outside of wedlock: 
namely, those born into wedlock are presumed to be the 
  
 150 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 218 (N.J. 2006) (“We fail to see any 
legitimate governmental purpose in disallowing the child of a deceased same-sex 
parent survivor benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act or Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Act when children of married parents would be entitled to such benefits. 
Nor do we see the governmental purpose in not affording the child of a same-sex 
parent, who is a volunteer firefighter or first-aid responder, tuition assistance when the 
children of married parents receive such assistance. There is something distinctly 
unfair about the State recognizing the right of same-sex couples to raise natural and 
adopted children and placing foster children with those couples, and yet denying those 
children the financial and social benefits and privileges available to children in 
heterosexual households.”). 
 151 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11.  
 152 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 7.  
 153 N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11. 
 154 See supra Part III.  
 155 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10. 
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natural children of the couple.156 This presumption then 
immediately engenders the right of the child to draw certain 
responsibilities from those parents. Therefore, the flow of the 
rights to the child is transitive: if marriage, then legitimacy; if 
legitimacy, then rights. Without marriage rights for the 
parents, a child cannot derive benefits from a non-birth-giving 
partner without a long and costly adoption process. This 
burdens the child in a way that a child legitimized by married 
parents is not. While the marriage statute does not 
discriminate on the basis of legitimacy directly, by determining 
that marital children get one benefit and nonmarital children 
another, it forcibly classifies certain children into the category 
of illegitimate when the law prohibits those children’s parents 
from marrying each other.157 The marriage law, more than 
drawing distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate 
children, creates these distinctions of illegitimacy that would 
not otherwise exist. These distinctions carry with them what 
the Supreme Court called a “condemnation on the head of an 
infant [that] is illogical and unjust.”158 While this type of law-
created illegitimacy has never been considered by any court, 
the inescapable deprivation of rights faced by the children of 
gay parents is contrary to the policies looked to previously by 
the Supreme Court in ruling that questions of legitimacy 
deserved intermediate scrutiny.159 For this reason, coupled with 
New York’s history of supporting unique family structures,160 a 
court might rule that a child’s equal protection claim warrants 
intermediate review.  
2.  Applying the Standard  
If a New York court applied the intermediate standard 
of review to a challenge of the law on illegitimacy grounds, any 
law barring gay marriage would have to be proven 
substantially related to an important government objective.161 
  
 156 N.Y. DOM. REL. L. § 24(1) (1969). 
 157 It is a standard evidentiary principle that “[t]here is a presumption that a 
child born in wedlock, that is, while the mother was united with a husband in 
marriage . . . is legitimate.” 46 N.Y. JUR. 2D, Domestic Relations § 843. Therefore, the 
opposite must be true—a child born to unwed parents is presumed illegitimate.  
 158 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).  
 159 See supra Part III.  
 160 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 421.16(h)(2) (2007); Braschi v. 
Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989).  
 161 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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The Court of Appeals’ analysis in Hernandez would thereby 
recoil upon itself. In Hernandez, the court enumerated two 
important government objectives believed to be at the core of 
the marriage law’s distinction between homosexual and 
heterosexual couples: promotion of procreation and promotion 
of dual sex parenting.162  
Despite the first proffered motive, the promotion of 
childbirth may be undermined by forbidding gay marriage. 
Because lesbian couples without the benefit of marriage do not 
enjoy the advantages of presumed dual parentage, these 
couples might decide to forego plans to conceive using 
alternative reproductive measures. Deterring homosexuals 
from conceiving children might achieve the desired result of 
promoting dual sex parenting, but such an effort ignores the 
reality of the same-sex parenting already in place in the United 
States.163 Simply because the legislature may want to increase 
the number of children being raised by both a mother and a 
father, it cannot wash away the inherent federal constitutional 
right of homosexual Americans to procreate.164 The state cannot 
pursue its objective in opposition to rights guaranteed at the 
federal level.165 Homosexual women in this country can, and 
will, continue to have children, meaning that children will in 
fact be raised by same-sex parents. The state would essentially 
have to claim that treating similarly situated children 
differently is substantially related to discouraging Americans 
from exercising their fundamental right to procreate. It seems 
unlikely that any court would hold that state equal protection 
rights can be legislated around in order to deter people from 
exercising a fundamental right protected by the Federal Due 
Process Clause.166 Therefore, if held to the intermediate 
standard of review, it appears plausible that a child’s equal 
protection claim could invalidate anti-gay marriage legislation, 
if the government cannot offer more important objectives than 
those relied upon in Hernandez.  
  
 162 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006). 
 163 See supra notes 118-121.  
 164 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 165 U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 166 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.  
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C.  The Benefit of a Child’s Equal Protection Challenge—
Reframing the Social Debate  
An equal protection challenge brought by a child might 
also be successful for non-legal reasons. Specifically, a child’s 
argument that she deserves an equal opportunity to be 
legitimized by her gay parents, in the same way her peers born 
to married heterosexual parents are already legitimized, could 
create a shift in the social and moral framework of the gay 
marriage debate. 
To date, the debate over gay marriage in the public 
square has been largely cantankerous. The opponents of gay 
marriage unabashedly proclaim “that marriage is between a 
man and a woman, as God and nature intended.”167 These anti-
gay marriage advocates often cite religious and moral 
convictions for the basis of their firmly held beliefs.168 On the 
other side, advocates of gay marriage, often feeling personally 
attacked, resort to oversimplified name calling, for example, 
calling anti-gay marriage advocates “homophobic bigots” 
(especially common in the internet “blogosphere”).169 Too often 
there seems to be little common ground to be found.  
However, one would be hard pressed to find an 
individual who does not want all children to receive adequate 
care. In the United States there is an increasing incidence of 
children being raised in single-family homes as well as a 
corresponding incidence of increased divorce.170 And while there 
are those who undoubtedly disapprove of homosexual couples 
raising children,171 it is an unalterable reality that gay couples 
are raising children172 and that all Americas have a right to 
procreate if they so chose.173 So the new question, in a debate 
over children’s equal protection rights, would be “How can the 
  
 167 Pat Buchanan, Time for a New Boston Tea Party, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: 
THE MORAL AND LEGAL DEBATE 85, 85 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 
2d ed. 2004). 
 168 See, e.g., PETER SPRIGG, OUTRAGE: HOW GAY ACTIVISTS AND LIBERAL 
JUDGES ARE TRASHING DEMOCRACY TO REDEFINE MARRIAGE 112-17 (2004).  
 169 See, e.g., Posting of Pam Spaulding to Pamspaulding.com, http:// 
www.pamspaulding.com/weblog/2004_11_01_pamspaulding_archive.html (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2007) (on file with author) (disparaging conservative stalwart Phil Burress for 
his support of Ohio’s gay marriage ban).  
 170 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WHO CARES FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN? 22 
(Cheryl D. Hayes et al. eds., 1990). 
 171 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
 172 See supra Part IV.A.  
 173 See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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state best accommodate the needs of children raised by gay 
parents who deserve the benefits of legitimacy and dual 
parentage?” One unmistakable way to give children those 
benefits is by allowing their parents to marry.174 By framing the 
debate in these terms, the focus shifts to the rights of children 
with whom no one can possibly find moral fault. If the debate 
were to move in this new direction and gain traction, this non-
legal concept, together with the unique legal posturing of the 
proposed equal protection claim, could forever change the gay 
marriage debate on both the state and federal levels.  
V. POTENTIAL FEDERAL IMPLICATIONS OF A CHILD’S  
EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE 
If a state like New York were to entertain both the 
aforementioned policy goals and the premise of invalidating its 
gay marriage ban based on Equal Protection claims raised by 
the children of homosexual couples, it would undoubtedly open 
a new wave of speculation regarding gay marriage and the 
Federal Constitution. To date, at least twenty-six states have 
added amendments to their state constitutions which serve to 
effectively preclude gay marriage.175 In addition, the Federal 
Defense of Marriage Act gives each state the right to refuse to 
recognize marriages sanctioned by other states.176 Regardless, 
  
 174 See supra Part IV.B. 
 175 For a detailed state-by-state list, including voting results, of all anti-gay 
marriage amendments enacted through 2004, see Baker, supra note 74, at 239-42.  
  Additionally, seven states passed amendments in the most recent  
midterm election on November 7, 2006. See Will Sullivan, Voters Ban Gay Marriage, 
Back Minimum Wage, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORTS, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/061108/8ballot.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 
2007). For a complete, though unofficial, breakdown of the status of gay marriage in all 
fifty U.S. states, see Same-Sex Marriage Status in the United States by Statute, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_state_laws_on_same-sex_unions (last visited Oct. 
14, 2007). 
  In addition to state constitutional amendments, some have proposed an 
amendment to the Federal Constitution that would define marriage as only occurring 
between one man and one woman. See Christopher Wolfe, Why the Federal Marriage 
Amendment Is Necessary, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 895, 895 (2005). However, even the 
amendment’s proponents do not believe its passage is likely, if only because amending 
the Constitution is such an arduous a task. Id.  
 176 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). Its two separate statutory provisions follow: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
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under the Supremacy Clause, no state constitution may offend 
the Federal Constitution.177 Therefore, if a state like New York 
adopted the view that a ban on gay marriage violated equal 
protection by drawing distinctions based on the forced 
illegitimacy of the children born to gay couples, it would be 
inevitable that a similar claim would be brought in federal 
court in an attempt to convince the Supreme Court to adopt 
this view as well. If successful, a single lawsuit could force 
every state constitutional amendment banning gay marriage to 
be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny and possibly eradicate 
them all.  
However, because not all anti-gay marriage amend-
ments are worded identically, the effects of a child’s successful 
Equal Protection claim would be felt differently state by state. 
To understand this differentiation it is necessary to classify the 
various state amendments and analyze each permutation 
accordingly. In his article, “Status, Substance, and Structure,” 
Joshua Baker considered each of the state marriage 
amendments in place as of 2005.178 The framework he proposes 
classifies them into three distinct types: status amendments, 
substance amendments, and structure amendments.179 Each 
type of amendment would likely have its own unique strengths 
and weaknesses when held to the test of intermediate scrutiny. 
Therefore, each of these three types of amendments will be 
addressed in turn.  
To begin, the so-called substance amendments have 
been adopted by at least ten states.180 The typical text of a 
substance amendment reads: “Marriage in this state consists 
  
“spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 
wife. 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall 
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of 
any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship 
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws 
of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising 
from such relationship. 
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
 177 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (striking down on equal 
protection grounds Colorado’s constitutional amendment prohibiting state legislation 
enacted to protect homosexuals from discrimination); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 178 See Baker, supra note 74, at 223-37. 
 179 Id. at 222. 
 180 Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah. Id. at 240-42.  
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only of the union between a man and a woman. No other 
relationship shall be recognized as a marriage by this state or 
its political subdivisions, or given a substantially equivalent 
legal status.”181 These amendments are particularly troubling 
in the context of an equal protection challenge made by a child. 
The language precluding the possibility of an “equivalent legal 
status” is destructive because it leaves no opening for any of 
the rights associated with marriage, including the presumption 
of legitimacy, to become attached to a homosexual relationship. 
The complete barring of equivalent status leaves these 
amendments open to possible federal repeal if challenged by a 
child bringing a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Federal Constitution.182  
The other two types of amendments are similar to each 
other and, due to more benign wording, would presumably 
stand a better chance of surviving the Equal Protection 
challenge proposed herein. So-called status amendments 
typically read, “Only marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in this state.”183 Meanwhile, Hawaii’s 
amendment, the only so-called structural amendment, simply 
vests the power to define marriage exclusively with the 
legislature.184 These two amendment forms, while furthering 
the governmental interest in protecting traditional marriage, 
still leave open the possibility that a child of gay parents could 
be legitimized by some legislative action other than conferral of 
full marriage rights.185 These types of amendments stand a 
better chance than the substance amendments of surviving a 
successful Equal Protection claim brought by a child of gay 
parents.186 However, allowing gay parents to legitimize children 
born during their partnership would clearly necessitate the 
creation of some form of status equivalent to marriage for 
  
 181 Id. at 239.  
 182 “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
  The Equal Protection Clause is reverse incorporated against the federal 
government under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. See Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 183 Baker, supra note 74, at 239. 
 184 HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23.  
 185 See infra note 193 and accompanying text (noting some possible remedies, 
short of full gay marriage rights, that may help rectify the disparate treatment faced 
by children raised in households with same-sex parents).  
 186 For this reason, opponents of gay marriage should take note that the more 
malleable status and structure amendments may be preferable in the future due to 
their ability to weather various types of constitutional challenges.  
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homosexual relationships. Since this may not happen in any 
particular state, a court might find that the potential harm to 
the illegitimate children of gay parents is disproportionate  
to the government’s interest enshrined in these amendments.  
If a child could successfully bring an Equal Protection claim 
invalidating a state anti-gay marriage law, all these 
constitutional amendments, including the substance and 
structure amendments, may be susceptible to judicial repeal.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The gay marriage debate shows no signs of fading from 
the public consciousness.187 The bulk of the case law on this 
issue has been brought by gay couples on their own behalf with 
varying success188 and with a considerable amount of 
backlash.189 Today there is no shortage of industrious lawyers 
advocating on behalf of homosexual couples across the 
country.190 And with courts continuing to focus on the nexus 
between marriage and childrearing,191 it seems likely that some 
lawyer seeking a unique challenge will try her hand at arguing 
a claim similar to the one described herein.192 For these 
reasons, a claim to invalidate anti-gay marriage laws and 
amendments brought by a child of gay parents seems 
inevitable.  
For proponents of gay marriage, the most logical 
approach will be to attempt to cloak the question in the clothes 
of legitimacy in order to take advantage of intermediate 
scrutiny review. For opponents of gay marriage, this approach 
will raise new concerns. There are other potential ways to 
confer legitimacy on children without the need for marriage, for 
example, through pre-birth decrees and the little-known 
  
 187 See, e.g., KGO-TV/DT, abc7news.com, Gay Marriage Cases Moving to State 
Supreme Court (Nov. 7, 2006), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news&id= 
4738006 (noting that the California Supreme Court is preparing to hear its own round 
of challenges to domestic partnerships). 
 188 See supra Part II.  
 189 See generally Ball, supra note 75; Baker, supra note 74.  
 190 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 946-7 (Mass. 
2003) (naming approximately fifty attorneys who worked to complete over twenty-five 
briefs for submission to the Massachusetts Supreme Court in reference to the 
Goodridge case alone).  
 191 See supra Part II.  
 192 See supra Part IV.  
726 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
 
doctrine of parent by estoppel.193 These obscure techniques for 
bestowing expanded parent-to-child rights could be used more 
frequently and codified into law to lessen the harm caused to 
the children of gay parents born without the presumption of 
legitimacy. However, social conservatives at odds with gay 
marriage may find themselves uneasy about facilitating gay 
parentage by eliminating cross-adoption costs in the interest of 
establishing dual parentage for the children of gay couples.194 
Moreover, full marriage rights for gay parents seem to be the 
most direct way to ensure the full flow of marital benefits to 
the thousands of children being raised in gay households.  
If a child brings the Equal Protection claims described 
herein, it is likely that the new battleground of the gay 
marriage war will be over the amendment of state laws 
concerning the presumption of legitimacy and the narrow 
tailoring of all gay marriage-related constitutional amendments 
and legislation.195 Such a challenge would also likely reopen the 
debate over a federal constitutional amendment.196  
In the meantime, for the sake of the children, both sides 
of the debate should be prepared to do whatever is necessary to 
provide what is best for all children, regardless of who their 
parents are. Gay marriage is not only about gay rights, but also 
family rights: the rights of parents to claim their children as 
  
 193 See Osbourne, supra note 102, at 371-89 (discussing various child custody 
options open to gay parents including pre-birth decrees and parent by estoppel).  
Parent by estoppel is a fascinating concept:  
According to the ALI Principles, a parent by estoppel is one who, although 
not a biological or adoptive parent:  
[L]ived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full 
and permanent responsibility as a parent, as part of a prior co-parenting 
agreement with the child’s legal parent . . . to raise a child together each with 
full parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition 
of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests; or 
[L]ived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full 
and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with 
the child’s parent . . ., when the court finds that recognition of the individual 
as a parent is in the child’s best interests. 
Once a co-parent meets these circumstantial requirements of parent by 
estoppel, the co-parent has the rights and privileges of a legal parent, 
including standing to bring an action for custody. 
Id. at 389. 
 194 See supra Part IV.C (discussing the moral and religious objection to gay 
marriage).  
 195 See supra Part V (noting the differences between status, substance, and 
structural amendments with regard to constitutional analysis).  
 196 See supra notes 175-176.  
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their own and the rights of children to do the same with their 
parents. The gay marriage debate is already fourteen years old 
and counting, but the kids have yet to have their say. 
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